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This research paper addresses an overarching question related to women’s representation
in subnational politics. Which specific social and political conditions promote the descriptive
representation of women in subnational political units? The first section presents an analytical
review of literature to identify the social and political conditions found by researchers as creating
access points and spaces that aid women’s presence in subnational politics. Collectively, these
social and political conditions, including decentralization, create a theoretical framework that can
be utilized in comparative case analysis. The second and empirical part of this paper applies
several of these identified conditions to the subnational sphere in two different cultural contexts,
Peru and Russia. This comparative analysis fosters a more in-depth understanding of the
complexities surrounding women’s representation in subnational politics as I find that social and
political conditions, most especially decentralization, are highly contingent on cultural context
and existing gendered political structures and dynamics. The collision of political, social, and
cultural forces actually may work against women’s ability to gain a voice in prominent political
processes. A focus on the two countries of Peru and Russia, with their distinct social and political
milieus, allows me to provide a much more nuanced analysis in noting the degree to which these
political and social conditions have almost paradoxically helped in opening spaces of
representation for women while oftentimes challenging these spaces. This comparative analysis
in turn enables me to explore the relevance and salience of using social and political forces to
better understand women’s subnational representation.
The definition of women’s representation used in this paper draws on Hanna Pitkin’s
work (1967), but concentrates on descriptive representation as an initial step toward representing
traditionally marginalized groups within the political process. Specifically, descriptive
representation “refers to the extent to which representatives “stand for” the represented”
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(Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 408). The concept of descriptive representation in this
paper is further delineated as “social representation,” a subcategory that alludes to social traits,
which in this case is gender (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 409). In addition to descriptive
representation, Pitkin identified the other facets of representation: formal, substantive, and
symbolic representation. However, while the other three facets offer important insights and
interrelate with descriptive representation, institutional structures like decentralization, which is a
primary focus of this paper’s analysis, have frequently been singled out as contributing in
profound ways to shaping descriptive representation. This paper defines decentralization as a
process in which “resources, power, and often tasks are shifted to lower-level authorities who are
somewhat independent of higher authorities, and who are at least somewhat democratic” (Crook
& Manor, 2000, p. 1) and unpacks the popular belief that it “has the potential to empower
citizens, including such historically excluded groups as women” (International Knowledge,
2008, p. 2). Focusing on descriptive representation offers valuable insights into an important
avenue through which decentralization might shape the ability of women to enter the political
realm and find voice within it. Moreover, descriptive representation has the potential to play a
role in shaping other forms of representation. For example, higher levels of women’s descriptive
representation may correlate with greater levels of public confidence in political processes,
promoting symbolic representation and thereby making these processes more trusted and
reflecting the social change that can arise from greater representation of women in politics
(Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Barnes & Burchard, 2013). Consequently, “political systems
that nurture and protect the representation of less-advantaged groups can be trusted by members
of more advantaged groups to protect their interests as well” (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005,
p. 425). Although scholars differ on the connections between descriptive and substantive
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representation of women’s interests, some research indicates that descriptive representation is
important for advancing concrete policy outcomes that are favorable to women, which Pitkin
views as the most important form of representation (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Pitkin,
1967). This insight supports the argument that “the quality of women’s representation, in this
sense, is universal” because improving women’s representation in effect works to enhance
broader political structures (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 425). Research finds that a
greater number of women holding political positions “increase legislatures’ responsiveness to
women’s policy concerns” (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 407). Research has also largely
established that “constituents are more likely to identify with the legislature and to defer to its
decisions to the extent that they perceive a significant percentage of “people like themselves” in
the legislature,” which has been yet another influential argument to support women’s descriptive
representation (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, pp. 413-4). Altogether, these reasons establish
the value of studying and promoting women’s representation in the political sphere, in regards to
both their self-advancement and broader structural improvements in their political environments.
This research paper develops a theoretical framework that identifies social and political
forces viewed as shaping women’s representation in subnational politics. I build this framework
by discussing 1) social and cultural factors and 2) political institutions, within which
decentralization is a primary focus. Studies abound that conclude that “formal representative
structures and processes exert powerful influences on the extent of women’s descriptive
representation,” which exemplifies why this paper details some of the key social and political
structures that shape women’s presence in subnational politics (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler,
2005, p. 424). Furthermore, describing or discussing both social and political structures offers
readers a deeper understanding into the diverse and uneven realm of subnational politics (Snyder,
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2001; Pitschel & Bauer, 2009). The conclusion of the literature review explores whether
decentralization can be categorically viewed as a catalyst that opens up spaces for women’s
representation on the subnational level and then examines how social and political conditions
have in practice influenced women’s subnational representation in Peru and Russia. This
empirical focus on two disparate cultural contexts yields more interesting and broader insights by
demonstrating the applicability and effectiveness of the theoretical conditions framework
presented in the first section. This cross-cultural analysis begins to shed much-needed academic
attention on the complex interplay of decentralization and intersecting political and social forces.
Theoretical Framework for Understanding Women’s Subnational Descriptive
Representation
Social and cultural conditions
This paper elucidates several social and cultural factors that prior research has found as
either promoting or discouraging women’s political presence, including: local women’s
movements, social and cultural norms, political party ideologies, and diffusion processes. These
social factors directly influence the formation of political structures, have considerable effects on
marginalized groups, and may support or deter women’s political presence. Thus, an analysis
exploring just political structures would be one-dimensional and miss the breadth of complexity
associated with the overall conditions that influence women’s representation in subnational
politics.
Research has pointed to the positive impact that active local women’s movements have
had on promoting women’s representation in subnational politics (Weldon, 2002; Barnes &
Burchard, 2013). Indeed, studies have observed that “the political mobilization of women and
organization of women’s groups can play an important role in getting women elected to local
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offices” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 7). In a similar vein, Magda Hinojosa (2012) traced
the participation of women in political and social movements across Latin America, concluding
that women have throughout history been active and invested in advancing said movements.
Public support then nurtures the strength of women’s movements, the combination of which in
turn may usher more women into subnational positions. Furthermore, some scholars
convincingly argue that women’s movements are more successful in leveraging women’s
political representation when these movements are “autonomous,” that is, when they are
“devoted to promoting women’s status and well-being independently of political parties and
other associations that do not make the status of women their main concern” (Weldon, 2002, p.
1161) and thus are not embedded within the local political establishment. Lastly, the linkages
between civil society groups and subnational governments help to determine the level of
women’s descriptive representation. As decentralization is thought of as bringing the government
closer to the people (Valdés & Palacios, 1999), the presence of active local women’s movements
may bolster the intended effects of decentralization reforms, such as allocating more autonomy
to regular citizens and expanding representation of diverse social groups. This observation is
explored later in this paper.
In addition to women’s movements, social and cultural norms converge within society to
shape how women are perceived within society, affecting the extent to which men and women
alike view women as viable political representatives in the subnational realm. Scholars often
define the diverse spectrum of entrenched societal beliefs, attitudes, and traditions toward men
and women as “gender ideologies.” The concept of gender ideology suggests that subnational
descriptive representation may depend in part upon the sociocultural milieu regarding women’s
roles, which is relevant to this paper’s later analysis of the effectiveness of decentralization on
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women’s representation in Peru and Russia. A prime example of the salience of gender ideology
and its intersection with the political environment can be found in one scholar’s work on local
politics in Peru, which found that “women in the rural and less developed parts of the country
were reluctant to run for office because it was inconsistent with their traditional role in society
and they did not want their family and friends to think poorly of them” (Escobar-Lemmon &
Funk, 2015, p. 7). In this context, despite the decentralization reforms that had occurred at the
time, the cultural milieu halted any progress toward increasing women’s subnational
representation because women themselves had internalized norms that marginalized them as
political actors and excluded them from the public sphere. Building on this logic, Maria EscobarLemmon and Kendall Funk find that a general lack of public support toward women in
government and leadership “may decrease the chances that women will choose to run for office
and successfully win election” (2015, p. 7). Thus, a deeply-embedded cultural system that
normalizes and embraces traditional gender norms and practices has the potential to limit the
impact of institutional and structural reforms that might otherwise promote women’s descriptive
representation. Therefore, it is important to highlight the complex ways in which sociocultural
norms and gender ideologies interact with and shape the effectiveness of certain political
structures and reforms. At the same time, one should recognize that progress made in the social
sphere “alone will not push more women into elected office” (Htun & Piscopo, 2014, p. 16).
Social conditions that support women’s subnational representation will include the breakdown of
sexist or patriarchal attitudes and behaviors salient in a country and broader public acceptance of
women’s roles in the public sphere. Yet political conditions must exist in tandem with social
forces to promote women’s representation, a valuable insight relevant to this paper’s findings.
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Building on these social factors, dominant political party ideologies are viewed as
influencing women’s presence in subnational politics (Escobar-Lemmon and Funk, 2015;
Rincker & Ortbal, 2007; Viterna & Fallon, 2008). For example, some studies have found that
“left-leaning governments are generally more likely to appeal to female voters, to promote
female politicians, and to advance feminist policies” (Rincker & Ortbal, 2007, p. 4). This
research has also been substantiated in research on the Russian political system (Moser, 2003).
Furthermore, political party ideologies have been viewed as partially shaping the extent to which
governments incorporate women and prioritize women’s issues (Viterna & Fallon, 2008). Some
scholars posit that these ideologies manifest in tangible advances for women, while others argue
that they provide a better avenue for women to gain influence within political parties (Viterna &
Fallon, 2008). Thus, the dominant party ideology of the subnational government in power may
support or impede women’s representation. This logic also applies to the ways in which the
dominant political platform of a national government shapes the structures and practices of
subnational governments, all of which then play a role in determining levels of civic engagement
of marginalized groups.
Lastly, diffusion processes may also bolster women’s descriptive representation and
strengthen the institutional effects of decentralization. In a general sense, the notion of diffusion
suggests that the political or social developments in one country or region will diffuse naturally
to and emerge in nearby countries or regions; this process has often been applied to gender
studies. Perhaps most notably, diffusion has been said to occur after a country within a certain
region has instituted gender quotas (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015). This paper later reflects
on the presence and impact of gender quotas in both the regions of Latin America and Eastern
Europe, where diffusion can partially account for the variation we see in their implementation.
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Diffusion can also refer to the natural process in which more women are elected to subnational
positions, which results in a greater “probability that other women will be nominated and win
election” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). This insight will be particularly relevant when
assessing the degree to which social conditions such as diffusion noticeably shape women’s
representation in Peru and Russia.
Social and cultural conditions are often challenging to conceptually unpack and analyze
to examine their impact on women’s visibility in subnational politics. However, researchers posit
that the existence of the following social conditions may positively shape women’s subnational
representation: local women’s movements; less patriarchal social and cultural norms; pro-women
political party ideologies; and successful diffusion. The following section examines a range of
political institutions and their influence on women’s representation before focusing on
decentralization.
Political institutions
Extensive research has found that a wide range of political institutions may significantly
shape the descriptive representation of women in the halls of government (Barnes & Burchard,
2012). Indeed, “the chances for women to advance in political life depend, to an important
extent, on structural conditions in the political system” and can largely shape the policy issues
and objectives that are formulated and addressed (Rueschemeyer, 2015, p. 159). In these next
paragraphs, I explore the following political structures/conditions in relation to women’s
representation: electoral processes, including the electoral system that establishes proportional
representation and majoritarian structures; party and district magnitude; gender quotas; historical
institutional legacies; and gendered institutions. This political institution lens helps me to assess
the extent to which these conditions hold validity in Peru and Russia. This theoretical framework
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also provides an important context for the subsequent discussion of decentralization, an
institution that has not yet been extensively researched in contemporary literature but may serve
as a potentially significant access point through which women may gain descriptive
representation.
The rules and makeup of an electoral system may play a major role in influencing
women’s representation on the subnational level (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; EscobarLemmon and Funk, 2015). The belief that elections should be structured as “free, fair, and open”
aligns with liberal democracy and viewed as increasing the legitimacy of political institutions in
the eyes of the greater public (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 410). Whereas the free aspect
indicates that every citizen can engage in the electoral process, the fair and open aspects allude to
the electoral process as being egalitarian and decisive. This condition supports women’s
representation because in a legal sense, women candidates have an equal chance to obtain
political office as their male counterparts. They are also not excluded in or barred from voting or
otherwise participating in the elections. Furthermore, a popular theory within the field of
political science states “that political systems with more open and competitive elections will
elect representatives whose backgrounds more closely resemble those of the represented”
(Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 410). This observation suggests that a linkage indeed exists
between a free and fair electoral system and the descriptive representation of women on the
subnational level. Moreover, the level of competitiveness in electoral processes will have
interesting and somewhat differing implications in Peru and Russia.
It has also been largely accepted that the structure of the electoral system is instrumental
in promoting or impeding women’s representation. Majoritarian or plurality systems are known
to be less inclusive toward women seeking office, whereas proportional representation (PR)
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systems are deemed as more inclusive (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015; Vengroff, Nyiri, &
Fugiero, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Htun and Piscopo, 2014). A proportional representation
system is defined as “ensur[ing] minority groups a measure of representation proportionate to
their electoral support” (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010, para. 1). Studies show
that proportional systems “affect not just electoral outcomes, but opportunities for women as
candidates” (Vengroff et al., 2003, p. 164). Such a system aligns with the idea behind descriptive
representation, that is, ensuring that elected officials mirror the demographics of the constituents
whom they serve. A proportional system is also enhanced when, as described in more detail
below, party and district magnitude are at high levels (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). These
latter two factors “affect party strategy when choosing candidates” and in turn have the potential
to promote women’s representation, thereby signifying one reason as to why PR systems benefit
women (“The Effect,” n.d., para. 4). Furthermore, PR systems support women’s representation in
how it interacts with “contagion,” a process that is similar to diffusion and one in which “parties
adopt policies initiated by other political parties” (“The Effect,” n.d., para. 7). Such a scenario
often produces greater representation of women because parties in a PR system do not
experience negative results for selecting women due to the nature of the PR system, that is, “the
party would have several slots from which it could find room to nominate a woman” (“The
Effect,” n.d., para. 7). The political parties operating within this system may instead be greatly
rewarded for nominating women because “even a small increase in votes, caused by adding
women to the ticket, could result in the party winning more seats” (“The Effect,” n.d., para. 7). In
this sense, the process of contagion interacts positively with PR systems and helps to promote
women’s representation.
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In contrast, majoritarian systems are defined as supporting “the representation of a whole
constituency to a single candidate who may have received fewer than half of the votes cast” (The
Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010, para. 1). In the scenario outlined above with
contagion, the issue with majoritarian systems is that parties have a single candidacy position
and thus perceive a greater risk in nominating a female candidate as opposed to a male
counterpart (“The Effect,” n.d.). Parties may be less willing and certainly less incentivized to
equally represent women, especially when the male candidate so often comes from a “faction
which traditionally received the nomination” (“The Effect,” n.d., para. 7). As a result, not as
many women occupy seats under a plurality system. Moreover, contagion does not complement
a majoritarian system as it does the PR system. In the United States’ plurality system, for
example, “only 13 out of 100 senators and only 61 (14 percent) out of 435 Representatives were
women in 2001” (Vengroff et al., 2003, p. 164). In sum, scholars have found that women around
the world become elected in greater numbers under a proportional representation system (Htun &
Piscopo, 2014).
Two additional political structures cited as shaping women’s presence in subnational
units are party magnitude, that is, “the number of seats a party reasonably expects to win in the
next legislature” (Vengroff et al., 2003, p. 165) and district magnitude, which is “the number of
legislative seats assigned to a district” (ACE, 2013, p. 83). Studies find that greater levels of both
increase the likelihood of electing women (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015; Schwindt-Bayer &
Mishler, 2005). For example, a political party is more likely to take what it perceives to be a risk
in adding women–or a marginalized group more broadly–to its candidate list if the number of
seats the party has obtained in a subnational election is relatively high. Alternatively, a political
party who obtains one seat will forego taking said risk to include a female candidate and instead
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opt for the traditionally established route, that is, selecting a male candidate (Schwindt-Bayer &
Mishler, 2005). Such a scenario can be logically applied to district magnitude, as well. Overall,
in tandem with PR systems as described above, “electoral systems with greater proportionality
and higher district magnitudes elect larger percentages of women to legislatures” (SchwindtBayer & Mishler, 2005, pp. 411-2). Therefore, women benefit in a political system that reflects
higher levels of party and district magnitude.
Aside from the structures of electoral systems, gender quotas have been commonly
established as improving women’s representation around the world (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk,
2015; Barnes & Burchard, 2013). Studies in most countries across Latin America, for example,
have concluded that the “adoption of quota legislation increases the percentage of women in
office at the subnational level” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 5). Yet within the context of
gender quotas, certain stipulations have proven to more effective than others, such as
establishing a closed list option for candidates and a penalty for not adhering to the quotas
(Rueschemeyer, 2015; Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Gender quotas
are also notably more successful in putting women into office within the subnational legislative
arena, rather than in the subnational executive arena (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015). This
distinction is especially useful for identifying the conditions most conducive for women’s
representation, that is, finding one subnational branch to be more accessible than another.
Furthermore, related to the interaction between quotas and political parties, studies have found
that “the voluntary adoption of party quota laws” plays an especially important factor in ushering
women into political office (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). Therefore, gender quotas can
thus be said to be a positive contributing factor toward women’s descriptive representation in
subnational units, particularly in the legislative arena and within political parties.
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Furthermore, a country’s historical institutional legacy is cited as a common factor in
determining women’s presence in subnational politics and influencing the success of
decentralization in empowering subnational units. Studying communist legacies across Eastern
Europe, Diana Pitschel and Michael Bauer found that the historical institutional legacies of
communism in the region influenced the effectiveness of decentralization in that they “have a
crucial differential impact on the territorial restructuring and thus on the current institutional
setup of subnational political authority” (2009, p. 333). The political structures in place during a
specific political regime, such as socialism or communism, will remain in place even after the
collapse of these regimes. Such constancy carries over to affect the degree of autonomy of
subnational governments, which in turn influences women’s ability to access spaces within them.
A country’s previous familiarity with a free and fair electoral system within a democratic
framework, for example, is viewed widely as one condition that fosters women’s subnational
representation, whereas a country’s persisting ties with a communist past is viewed as
challenging women’s political presence. The salience of historical institutional legacy is
discussed in more detail later in this paper, and I find that its application to Peru reveals
interesting insights on the spaces created for women under authoritarianism. Considering the
relationship between historical institutional legacies and decentralization reforms will help to
understand in which contexts one might expect women’s subnational representation.
Institutions interact with and influence women’s representation in diverse ways. In her
seminal work about the gendered nature of institutions, sociologist Joan Acker (1990) recognizes
gendered institutions/organizations as ones in which “advantage and disadvantage, exploitation
and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a
distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine” (p. 146). Broadly speaking, these
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gendered attributes within institutions “have been obscured through a gender neutral . . .
discourse” (Acker, 1990, p. 140), which offers scholars today both challenges and windows of
opportunity in delineating the forces that influence women’s representation. While Acker’s
writing focused on organizational theory within the context of the United States, it is logical to
posit that government organizations/institutions can broadly be viewed as upholding specific
gender norms, behaviors, and practices. Researchers focusing on Latin America have drawn
similar conclusions in examining political institutions, like national legislatures and cabinets, and
often cite that these gendered dimensions hinder women’s equal political participation (Schwindt
Bayer, 2010; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2009).
Furthermore, the notion of “policy-images” points to the ways in which institutions may
“formalize and entrench the understandings of policies . . . preferred by dominant groups,” which
means that women’s lack of representation may not be viewed as a policy priority (Weldon,
2002, p. 1159). Thus, changes in institutions can both promote or be detrimental to women’s
presence in subnational politics. Laurel Weldon found that “institutional changes” (2002, p.
1154) are critical in determining women’s representation and that they must be altered if the
policy-images and “institutional bias” within a country persist in subordinating women (p. 1159).
In contrast, other scholars have noted that “institutional reforms of sub national government are
not as effective as assumed, especially scale enlargements such as amalgamations” (Schaap,
Geurtz, de Graaf, & Karsten, 2010, p. 159). In effect, such an observation suggests that
institutional reforms may not be implemented well nor researched sufficiently beforehand. The
ways in which these reforms interact with existing and fluid sociopolitical and economic
conditions within a country may be another factor that distorts the effectiveness of them.
Therefore, the gendered nature of political institutions will implicitly factor into shaping the level
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of women’s representation. Recognizing the gendered nature of institutions serves as a
conceptual compass to guide readers throughout the rest of this research paper and buttresses the
paper’s ultimate findings.
This section has explored political institutions that may shape women’s representation.
Overall, the political structures that appear to promote women’s descriptive representation are
the following: free and fair elections; proportional representation systems; high party and district
magnitude levels; historical institutional legacies accommodating toward women’s issues; and
gender quotas, especially those with closed lists and institutionalized penalty systems. Political
institutions are notably gendered and thus signify that the obstacles that women face in accessing
subnational spaces are oftentimes structural and deeply embedded into their social and political
systems. I will now consider decentralization as a relatively unexplored political institution that
advances an understanding of variation in women’s representation on the subnational level.
Decentralization
The gendered distribution and flow of power between levels of government and methods
for candidate selection have profound implications on women’s representation. The effects of
decentralization reforms are dependent on interconnecting cultural, political, and social
conditions within a country. The interaction of these conditions in turn may in fact negatively
influence the degree to which women can achieve representation in subnational politics, an
argument that will be posited when comparing the political and social landscapes of Peru and
Russia. Problematizing this political institution may become central to grappling with the reasons
that account for women’s sparse visibility in subnational political spaces.
As mentioned earlier, decentralization can be defined as occurring “when resources,
power, and often tasks are shifted to lower-level authorities who are somewhat independent of
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higher authorities, and who are at least somewhat democratic” (Crook & Manor, 2000, p. 1).
Furthermore, “elected bodies at lower levels must have substantial powers and resources
(financial and administrative), and strong accountability mechanisms must be created—to hold
bureaucrats accountable to elected representatives and elected representatives accountable to
citizens” (Crook & Manor, 2000, p. 1). In this sense, decentralization reforms may be perceived
as a method to lend more power and resources to subnational political units (Vengroff et al.,
2003). In some countries, effective decentralization reforms may also promote a system of
transparency and accountability as well as more access to political processes for everyday
citizens (Stein, 1998). Early advocates viewed decentralization as a vehicle that allowed “local
autonomy and self-government not only [to] serve as a political unit enabling people to realize
their own freedom, but also constitute an arena for political education” (Chang, 2010, p. 123). In
addition, researchers and government agencies alike argued that successful decentralization
reforms “provide better services and combat corruption” (Schaap et al., 2010, p. 157). Therefore,
these prominent ideas and beliefs bridge a connection between decentralization and the ultimate
aim of democracy.
Consequently, decentralization reforms can coincide with and often become embedded in
a broader dialogue about promoting democracy worldwide. Emphasizing such themes as
transparency, justice, and accountability, a narrative was constructed and propagated around the
world that strongly linked decentralization to democratization (National Democratic Institute,
2016; Grindle, 2009; Schaap et al., 2010; Pitschel & Bauer, 2009; Eaton, 2006; Moscovich,
2015). Amidst the waves of democratization that pervaded the late twentieth century, democracy
swiftly became the normative governance model, and countries aspired to implement
decentralization reforms in attempts to achieve greater democracy (Grindle, 2009; Diamond,
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2004; Pitschel & Bauer, 2009). For some countries, these efforts were victorious and produced
more liberal democratic practices. For others, said efforts produced much more complex and
often negative consequences for governance (Faguet, 2012). Indeed, these negative effects have
been largely ignored in international discourses and only recently has scholarly research
endeavored to unpack and determine the heterogeneous effects of decentralization in conjunction
with and apart from democratization, especially across Europe and Latin America (Eaton, 2009;
Pitschel & Bauer, 2009; Schaap et al., 2010; Moscovich, 2015). When conducting a crosscountry analysis of four countries—Brazil, Japan, Russia, and Sweden—Christina Andrews and
Michiel S. de Vries ultimately found that decentralization reforms only resulted in greater civic
participation in Sweden, viewed as “a typical developed, welfare country,” but not so in the other
less-developed or less-egalitarian countries (2005, p. 1). Other studies determine that “while
local autonomy and decentralization have been considered as a driving force and even stronghold
for a full-fledged, nation-wide democracy, decentralization . . . is in some cases conducive to the
unraveling of the integrity of the state system” (Chang, 2010, p. 118). Recent studies have cast
doubts on whether decentralization can be applied to all cultural or institutional contexts,
emphasizing a much more complex and cautionary narrative about the implementation of
decentralization reforms with which this paper ultimately aligns.
Decentralization has for years been supported by prominent international institutions and
organizations, such as the World Bank, in association with efforts toward supposedly
strengthening democracy, especially in the sense of strengthening “public participation”
(Andrews & de Vries, 2005, p. 1). One reasoning that supports this idea of bolstering
participation is that “effective decentralization allows subnational governments to more
efficiently and transparently provide social services and access to public information” (USAID,
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2012, p. 30). Decentralization then may be viewed as particularly favorable to underrepresented
and marginalized groups, such as women. In the case of Latin America, Kent Eaton found that
“the timing of decentralization, either in the course of the democratic transition or in its
aftermath, suggests that democratization has played an important causal role in the shift toward
more decentralized patterns of governance” (2006, p. 20). Another feature of decentralization
that may in theory promote the representation of marginalized groups is that “serious
decentralization and cooperation between subnational authorities really strengthens governing
capabilities and provides more flexible structures and ways of working” (Schaap et al., 2010, p.
159).
However, the intermingling of these forces does not always equate to positively shaping
women’s descriptive representation. For example, recent research finds that the “extent to which
a democratic country has an advanced industrial as opposed to a less developed or transitional
economy” will improve the level of representation of women in a country (Vengroff et al., 2003,
p. 171). That is, democracy may interact more positively with the intended effects of
decentralization (i.e. expanding women’s access points in politics) in more developed
economies. In fact, another study shows that “decentralization is not promoting women’s
representation in the legislative and bureaucratic [subnational] spheres” in burgeoning
democracies (Rincker & Ortbal, 2007, pp. 6-7). These insights seem to demonstrate that the level
of familiarity a country has with a democratic political system may impact the success of
decentralization, specifically in relation to women’s increased representation.
It is central to also understand that decentralization reforms may even work against
putting women in subnational office. For example, a recent study published by the United
Nations Development Programme concludes that “more decentralized countries have less women
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in subnational offices” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). In effect, as political units
become more decentralized, “the relative power and importance of the locality appears to
decrease women’s electoral prospects” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). This insight is
relatively novel and contrasts with early research, some of which is mentioned here, that
propagates decentralization as a vehicle for women’s greater visibility in the subnational political
realm. Yet this insight may help to explain why we see later in Peru and Russia’s cases that
decentralization has not been a uniformly positive vehicle in supporting women’s subnational
representation. These findings across various geographic contexts suggests that the interplay of
democracy and decentralization is much more multidimensional than was initially suspected by
experts and governments during the push for decentralization reforms in the late twentieth
century. Thus, researchers now argue that decentralization’s effects on the political system and
greater representation of women are uneven and dependent on structural factors, three of which
are discussed below: electoral competitiveness and male political elite, gendered power
hierarchy, and centralized candidate selection process. Indeed, to understand more deeply how
decentralization may promote or impede women’s representation, it is important to consider
these broader political dynamics that are present amidst the implementation of decentralization
reforms.
The established male political elite can be empowered by decentralization reforms,
pushing out female candidates and blocking their access to representation (Escobar-Lemmon &
Funk, 2015). An increasingly common phenomenon, a more competitive political process—
although it may signify as being a more legitimate process–on the subnational level has been
found to directly challenge women’s representation. This finding might hold merit because as a
government becomes decentralized, it yields greater decision-making power (Escobar-Lemmon
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& Funk, 2015; Htun & Piscopo, 2014) and is thus a more attractive space in which to seek office.
Indeed, Gibson (2013) demonstrates that “a decentralized territorial system maximizes the
degree of autonomy enjoyed by subnational governments” (p. 17). In Latin America, the
gubernatorial and mayor positions are more desired because they have considerable autonomy
over the fiscal budgets, or “political ‘pork’” (Htun & Piscopo, 2014, p. 6). Consequently,
decentralized positions in this region “become more attractive to high quality male candidates”
(Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). This point is critical to consider in my analysis of Peru
and Russia, as it supports the broader argument that women may only gain greater representation
when their positions are not threatened by the established male political elite. Higher levels of
competition mean that more women are pushed out of the political process or not able to secure
higher-level positions. For example, a recent study found that “women in the Argentine national
Congress . . . are significantly less likely than male legislators to have occupied “high pork”
offices, such as governor and mayor” (Htun & Piscopo, 2014, p. 6). While a competitive
electoral system is often perceived as being more legitimate and may attract women to partake in
it, the competition also works against them as more male candidates hope to fill the same
positions. Sources like the United Nations Development Programme have concluded in recent
years that “more decentralized countries have less women in subnational offices [than in
countries with little to no decentralization]” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). Increased
electoral competitiveness from decentralization reforms may disadvantage women while more
generally adding legitimacy to the overarching political process, which demonstrates the
complex political terrain that female politicians are forced to navigate.
Building on these insights, a gendered power structure within decentralized subnational
units may also emerge in conjunction with increased political competition, which can also result
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in women occupying less prestigious positions (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015). This gendered
power structure works to maintain and enrich male politicians’ positions of influence and
challenges female candidates’ ability to penetrate or gain equal footing in such spaces. Recent
research in Brazil found that “women are more successful in municipal elections in the poorer,
less developed regions of Brazil” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). As this example
shows, female candidates may end up achieving more electoral success in poorer communities
because within these contexts, subnational elections may not be as competitive, decentralized
units may receive dismal budgets or resources, etc. Studies have also shown that in the
subnational realm, “since executive posts are often more powerful and prestigious than
legislative positions in Latin America, the finding [is] that women do better in legislative
elections than in executive ones” (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6). This insight adds
validity to this paper’s argument that women gain more access in less influential political
positions under a decentralized political system because of the gendered interplay of politics and
power. They are also simultaneously pushed out of more prestigious decentralized positions
because male political elite desire them, that is, the additional resources and autonomy attached
to them. Furthermore, this discussion of gendered power structures and electoral competitiveness
within decentralized spaces demonstrates the pervasiveness of male dominance across
decentralized political institutions, a trend that has recurred in most regions of the world,
including Latin America (Christie, 2015). Overall, an entrenched male political elite and
gendered power dynamics intertwine with decentralized units to significantly challenge women
from accessing subnational political office.
Lastly, the candidate selection process of subnational political parties may hinder
women’s descriptive representation if this process is, in fact, decentralized. A decentralized
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candidate selection process suggests that “local party members choose candidates for their
district,” compared to a centralized candidate selection process where “national party members
choose candidates for all subnational districts” (Escobar-Lemmon & Frank, 2015, p. 6). In effect,
giving national actors this responsibility is said to override the “local power enclaves” that have
been discussed above and which are particularly gendered on the subnational level (EscobarLemmon & Frank, 2015, p. 6). Indeed, female candidates competing in local elections may face
more salient gendered power dynamics than those competing in the national realm. For example,
studies indicate that subnational political spaces to a greater degree uphold “patriarchal or
machista political culture and patronage,” both of which have traditionally deterred and still
today bar women’s involvement in politics in regions such as Latin America (Rincker & Ortbal,
2007, p. 7). Consequently, scholars recommend that subnational political parties establish a
centralized selection process, concluding that this centralized structure is less susceptible to these
political power dynamics that discourage women from accessing political office. The process of
self-nominating—an alternative to decentralized or centralized candidate selection—has also
been found to disproportionately disadvantage women, who are “less likely than men to selfnominate” because their socialization experiences have so often relied on feeling or being
subordinate in society (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 6).
To review, I have discussed the social and cultural conditions that appear to positively
influence women’s subnational representation, including active local women’s movements, less
traditional/patriarchal cultural and social norms, and diffusion processes. I then have argued that
the following political conditions may promote women’s subnational representation: free and fair
elections; proportional representation; high party and district magnitude levels; historical
institutional legacies; and gender quotas. Referencing Acker’s work, I emphasized the enduring
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and implicit nature of institutions as gendered, which serves as a conceptual tool to demonstrate
the longstanding and structural challenges that women face and negotiate with in the public
realm. I then described how decentralization reforms were at first viewed largely as a positive
vehicle for stronger democratic governance but have recently been found to be more problematic
as they helped to spread democratization in mainly Western countries. Considering the negative
or unintended effects, decentralization may become a downright hindrance to women’s
subnational representation in some countries because it increases the competitiveness of electoral
processes, thereby allowing the local male political elite to crowd out women from office. This
scenario exacerbates the existing gendered power structures within these decentralized spaces
and pushes women toward less prestigious or influential positions. In contrast to a decentralized
candidate selection process, a centralized candidate selection process for subnational political
parties helps to ameliorate the negative influence of the local male elite and gendered power
dynamics. These interrelated political factors demonstrate that decentralization can actually bar
women’s subnational representation.
Empirical Case Studies: Peru and Russia
In the above section, I explored extant literature discussing political and social conditions
that have been observed as promoting or hindering women’s representation. This framework
provides the foundation for a comparative empirical analysis of women’s descriptive
representation in Peru and Russia. In general, this paper’s comparative approach aligns with the
“most different systems design,” which posits that “highly diverse” cases in fact encourage more
substantive comparisons (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 111). An increasingly prominent
methodology used in the realm of comparative politics (Przeworski & Teune, 1970; Mills,
Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010), this research design directs attention beyond specific social systems,
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thus enabling one to posit deeper findings and broader regional alternatives for public policy
initiatives. This particular methodology has been applied to respected case studies like that of
France, Russia, and China, which underscores its applicability in various settings and ability to
provide substantive research findings drawing from contexts that showcase “maximum
heterogeneity” (Mills et. al, 2010, p. 2). In addition to a number of studies that have in the recent
past provided comparisons between these two countries’ political and social milieus, Peru and
Russia present especially useful case studies because they have both experienced periods of
centralization and decentralization reforms within a similar timeframe yet in contemporary times
reflect distinct social and political systems. Thus, I consider this research methodology to be an
effective approach to understanding divergent systems and the overarching structural conditions
that often are subtle or overlooked within specific cultural contexts. The insights from the cases
of Peru and Russia can translate to future studies conducted on other nations, as researchers
attempt to better grasp the tensions and interplay of social and political conditions and women’s
representation.
Previous studies have determined that a focus on the subnational level reflects several
advantages. For example, subnational-level studies are a more controlled unit of analysis
(Giraudy, 2012; Snyder, 2001) and can more aptly “handle the spatially uneven nature of major
processes of political and economic transformation” (Snyder, 2001, p. 93). In choosing to study
two disparate countries, this latter insight is especially useful. Furthermore, an analysis of
women’s representation in specifically subnational politics helps me to more deeply examine the
nuanced interplay of institutions and public policy (Snyder, 2001). In fact, a subnational
comparative approach offers insights into the complexities and heterogeneity across sublevel

25

political institutions and their variant effects on women, which helps to explain why this method
is being increasingly used in contemporary political science research (Snyder, 2001).
Peru’s government
This subsection first introduces decentralization trends more broadly across Latin
America before describing Peru’s decentralization process and the social and political milieu
during its simultaneous democratic transition. It concludes with mentioning some formal
commitments that Peru has made toward gender equality, particularly in the realm of politics.
In Latin America, both political and fiscal decentralization have been implemented in the
past decades amidst several waves of democracy-building across the region (Stein, 1998;
Vergara, 2011). These processes initially started during the 1980s and 1990s (Moscovich, 2015).
However, democracy and decentralization have not always coexisted in Latin America as they
largely do today. Earlier research has identified certain areas that exemplify regime
juxtaposition, which is “the existence of subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) alongside a
democratic national government,” across the region (Giraudy, 2012, p. 2). The result is that “at
the subnational level elections are still severely manipulated, the civic liberties of the local
populations are partially suppressed, and varying degrees of harassment and violence . . . skew
the playing field in favor of incumbents” (Giraudy, 2012, p. 2). More broadly, politically
decentralized units across Latin America are primarily characterized by “the unevenness in terms
of resources, state capacity and democratization, and their relative strength and autonomy in
relation to central government” (Moscovich, 2015, p. 5). Studies have concluded that such a
trend has arisen because “all of the countries in the region underwent different kinds of
decentralization processes during the last decades” (Moscovich, 2015, p. 8). Other scholars view
decentralization in conjunction with democratization in Latin America as having had positive
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results. For example, “by bringing government closer to the people, decentralization has widened
opportunities for deliberation and participation and has given citizens a more tangible and “close
to home” sense of their rights and responsibilities in the political process” (Sabatini, 2003, p.
149). Amidst broader regional trends, we can now turn toward decentralization’s effects in Peru.
In Peru, the government committed to democratization after the decade-long dictatorship
under Alberto Fujimori and consequently initiated decentralization reforms nationwide during
the period of 2000-2010 (Vergara, 2011). Despite efforts by invested international actors such as
the World Bank, decentralization occurred unevenly and with varying degrees of success across
the country, and the nation struggled for years to reacquaint itself to a democratic mode of
governance (Araoz, 2013; World Bank, 2010). Civic participation in political processes has been
steadily encouraged yet has been slow to develop; at the same time, several civil society groups
have been created to monitor the progress of decentralization (World Bank, 2010).
In addition to its 196 provinces, Peru is more broadly divided into a total of 25
administrative regions, and each of these regions is mandated by national law to develop an
official strategy that supports gender equality. While the objective of greater gender equality is
often expressed verbally and in written form, the implementation and accountability are often
problematic and inadequate. Peru’s Ombudsman’s Office pointed out that “only 15 regional
governments have approved gender equality plans, and of these, five have not earmarked any
funds to put them into effect” (Salazar, 2011, para. 2). In a more general sense, Peru appears to
have formal policies already in place that emphasize importance of achieving gender equality.
For example, in recent years it has developed the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and
Men, which “calls for the viewpoints of both women and men to be included when formulating
regional development policies, plans, budgets and projects” (Salazar, 2011, para. 7). Yet the
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issue arises such that women involved in these decision-making processes have yet to be
successful in “allocating resources to close the gender gap” (Salazar, 2011, para. 8). What this
trend suggests is that while women in greater numbers are accessing positions of decisionmaking and policy-making in Peru, they are restrained in their ability and influence to sway
where the money ultimately goes. One of several factors contributing to this problem may be in
sufficient oversight or accountability in ensuring substantive policy outcomes that reflect
women’s contributions in these processes. As Teresa Valdés and Indira Palacios (1999) from the
Women and Development Unit of ECLAC discern, these policies mentioned reflect the Peruvian
state’s “political will” in promoting gender equality (p. 20). However, the “political results” of
this commitment is inadequate, suggesting that the “consequences of different processes or
actions in relation to a specific target” are still not widespread (Valdés & Palacios, 1999, p. 21).
Application of theory to Peru: Social conditions analysis
The following paragraphs will examine how local women’s movements, cultural and
social norms, and political party ideologies shape women’s subnational representation in Peru.
Although local women’s movements have been particularly active in Peru’s recent history and
today advocate for a range of political aims, Peruvian society still largely esteems traditional
gender roles and women’s participation in solely the private sphere, a trend particularly common
in less developed or rural areas. Along with national parties, subnational political parties do not
appear to prioritize women’s visibility in office, regardless of ideological preference, although
this latter finding needs to be more extensively researched in future studies.
Local women’s movements in Peru have been perceived as generally improving women’s
subnational representation and have noticeably taken political undertones. Generally across Latin
America, women have historically been instrumental in initiating and building successful
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movements to advance their human and civil rights, such as advocating for the right to vote
(Hinojosa, 2012; Rousseau, 2006). In the late twentieth century, numerous women’s groups
cropped up across Peru because of the nation’s largescale political and economic chaos during
the 1980s; the creation of these women’s organizations in turn inspired many women to enter
subnational political office, as well as assume various leadership roles in their communities in
the 1980s and especially in the 1990s (Blondet, 2002). These movements were sustained and
grew more salient and accepted in broader society during President Fujimori’s reign, as
discussed in the next paragraph, yet were forced to relinquish some of their influence once Peru
transitioned to democracy and political parties became the prominent vehicle to gain political
and social representation (Rousseau, 2006). Nonetheless, studies show that the existence of these
movements are critical for advances in women’s rights. In recent times, both in Peru and other
Andean countries, women have been pivotal actors in jumpstarting indigenous rights movements
since the late twentieth century (Hinojosa, 2012). Their participation reflects women’s constant
investment in and contributions to their community, as well as their agency in having the ability
and resources to do so. Many of these local movements continue to reflect political undertones,
especially regarding indigenous women’s movements and their efforts to have indigenous
women represented in both national and subnational political office. Along with the multilayered
and controversial institutional legacy that the Fujimori regime left, discussed in the next
subsection, women have found greater political representation on the subnational level and
ultimately “represent an identifiable and, to a certain extent, recognized social force” (Blondet,
2002, p. 17). This identity-construction process is more of an intangible but nonetheless critical
factor in supporting women’s representation.
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Furthermore, traditional cultural and social norms in Peru, commonly seen as reflecting
machismo, coalesce to serve as a force that has historically marginalized and still today impedes
women’s representation in subnational politics. Broadly speaking, a great deal of research from
scholars and government entities since the late twentieth century has alluded to culture as being
one of several critical factors that have kept women out of subnational political office (SchwindtBayer, 2010; Hinojosa, 2012; United Nations, 2004). This finding will also resonate later with
Russia’s case. One scholar found that impoverished women across the rural regions of Peru often
did not view local politics as a viable space for them because “they did not want their family and
friends to think poorly of them,” due to the stigma attached to women’s participation in the
public sphere, that is, outside of the home (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 7). In this
scenario, stereotypical gender norms in Peruvian society shaped these women’s belief that
politics was not an acceptable domain for them and they are not fit to take on political
responsibilities. These attitudes and behaviors demonstrate the enduring presence and strength of
machismo, a systemic cultural phenomenon akin to patriarchy, within Peru. A study as recent as
August of 2016 revealed that 74% of Peruvians view its society as machista and a mere 2% of
Peruvians view its society as feminist (Martinez, 2016). Additionally, the Peruvian government
concluded that even when women do occupy subnational positions of power, “they are still given
professional functions that constitute an extension of woman’s private role of caring for and
attending to the needs of the family” (United Nations, 2004, p. 18). Furthermore, those people
who oppose women’s greater representation in subnational positions often allude to “religious
suggestions in order to disqualify them as citizens,” which reflects the enduring influence that
culture and religion collectively have on a country like Peru (Olivari, n.d., p. 7). While
traditional cultural and social norms toward gender continue to challenge women’s
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representation in subnational politics, this finding is no doubt aggravated by entrenched patterns
of poverty in rural areas and insufficient funds to contribute toward gender equality (“Women,”
n.d.). In fact, one study found that “among the regions lacking plans or funds for promoting
equal opportunities are Apurímac, Huancavelica, Cajamarca, Huánuco, Ancash, Cuzco and
Puno, which also have the highest rates of illiteracy among the general population and,
specifically, among women, and the highest rates of gender-based violence” (Salazar, 2011, para.
3). This finding indicates that a substantial number of subnational governmental units across
Peru are not only plagued by systemic social issues but also do not have funding available to
actively promote or advance women’s representation. Nonetheless, recent research shows that in
Latin America, people not only “are now more likely to believe that women belong in the public
sphere,” but also that they “believe that women are underrepresented in politics” (Hinojosa,
2012, p. 35). There is then hope that more egalitarian social beliefs are emerging in Peruvian
society but still face considerable pushback from sexist attitudes and beliefs toward women.
Enduring machismo and larger, systemic intersecting cycles of poverty and insufficient resources
intersect with one another to discourage women’s descriptive representation in subnational
politics.
Noting that less machista or sexist social and cultural norms are more commonplace
across the more developed regions of Peru, I found over-time data to support this observation.
From studying data of the female and male mayors in Peru’s 25 regions from 1983 till present
day collected by Peru’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (Instituto, n.d.), it appears
that the percentage of women who hold mayoral office in major metropolitan areas like Lima is
greater than the percentage of women in less developed urban regions like Ayacucho and
Arequipa. Moreover, less developed or rural regions like Ucayali have not seen a single female
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mayor in over ten years (Instituto, n.d.). More generally, we see that the less developed regions
have supported just one or two female mayors in each election cycle since 1983, as opposed to
male candidates in the double digits (Instituto, n.d.). These data suggest that the more
economically developed urban centers of Peru support higher levels of women’s representation
in subnational office, which may reflect a connection between women’s representation and more
economically advanced regions of the country. However, in all regions, women’s subnational
representation over time is significantly lower than that of their male counterparts. This
observation holds true for their national representation, as well.
While subnational political parties in Peru have gained greater autonomy in recent years
to form their own party platforms due to successful decentralization, their party ideologies are
not linked to greater subnational representation of women. National political parties in Peru have
traditionally been disorganized and struggle in contemporary times to take part in and influence
subnational political processes (Vergara, 2011; International IDEA, Inter-Parliamentary Union,
& Stockholm University, eds., 2016). A primary reason for this is cited by Christopher Sabatini,
who finds that national political parties in Peru are often unable to adapt to the structures and
dynamics that decentralization establishes, therefore, they are “not well-equipped
organizationally to deal with its [decentralization] political consequences” (2003, p. 149).
Decentralization reforms across the country have actually served to diminish the power and
influence of national political parties and consequently, national parties have weakened in the
face of “direct election of local officials and loss of control over patronage” (2003, p. 149).
Subnational political parties, then, have emerged since 2000—the start of decentralization in
Peru—and have partly disrupted the platform and policy agenda of the national government, the
reason being that subnational party ideologies have autonomy to address the context-specific
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challenges and policy interests respective of their constituents (Sabatini, 2003). While their
leverage and influence then are greater, the extent to which subnational political parties integrate
women’s rights and issues is not commonplace, especially in reference to indigenous women’s
rights and issues (International IDEA, Inter-Parliamentary Union, & Stockholm University, eds.,
2016). In Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, some scholars have recently found that “left
parties were no more likely than those on the right to nominate or elect women,” though studies
are restricted mainly to the national level (Morgan & Hinojosa, 2016, p. 5). While
decentralization has given autonomy to subnational parties to allow them to develop party
platforms in line with their constituents’ interests (i.e. do not necessarily follow the platform of
national parties), both right-wing and left-wing subnational parties have not been incentivized
nor pushed to advocate for women’s issues and elect women into office.
So far, in juxtaposing Peru’s political and social landscape with the paper’s theoretical
framework, active local women’s movements in the last decades of the twentieth century appear
to serve as a critical springboard upon which women’s representation considerably expanded on
the subnational level and more broadly in the public domain. Perhaps surprising, leftist political
party ideologies are not seen as strengthening women’s descriptive representation on the
subnational level in Peru. Additional research will shed greater light, but political party ideology
in the subnational realm may not play as large a role as expected in supporting women’s
subnational representation. This analysis now shifts toward applying the identified political
conditions to the Peruvian case.
Application of theory to Peru: Political institutions analysis
I will now discuss how the structure and nature of the electoral system and application of
gender quotas in Peru affects women’s descriptive representation. I argue that proportional
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representation, high party and district magnitude, and free and fair elections all bolster women’s
subnational presence. Furthermore, Peru’s institutional legacy of authoritarianism under Fujimori
has both surprisingly and arguably promoted women’s presence in subnational politics and more
broadly in the public sphere, and subnational gender quotas play an integral role in increasing
women’s representation in political office.
In line with this paper’s conditions framework, Peru’s electoral rules within a PR system
promote women’s representation on the subnational level. Yet these electoral structures are
effective in leveraging women in subnational politics only when combined with gender quotas,
which is described below (Piscopo & Hinojosa, 2013). Although there exists variation between
Peru’s provincial and cosmopolitan areas, research has shown that high district and party
magnitude have generally produced greater subnational representation of women in Peru,
applicable to both districts in Lima and districts outside of the city (Schmidt & Saunders, 2004).
One noticeable exception to this trend occurred in 1998, in which women’s greatest success in
gaining subnational office in the 1998 municipal elections actually occurred in areas of
particularly low district magnitude, specifically those outside Lima (Schmidt & Saunders, 2004).
Furthermore, subnational elections have largely been viewed as being free and fair (“BTI,” 2016)
and offer closed-list options, all of which are conditions favorable to improving women’s access
to subnational office (Schmidt & Saunders, 2004). At the same time, subnational elections may
be just as if not more vulnerable to cases of “corruption and crime,” which recent reports has
found as being ongoing today (“BTI,” 2016, para. 4). This latter observation suggests that
decentralization reforms have not reduced corruption on the subnational level, which in theory
they are designed to do.
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Peru’s historical institutional legacy centers largely on having experienced
authoritarianism under Alberto Fujimori in the last decade of the twentieth century, in which
women’s representation in the public sphere noticeably increased, including on the subnational
level. As mentioned above, many women’s movements gained momentum in the 1980s, which
encouraged and provided access points for women to take part in important social and political
processes on the subnational level. When elected in 1990 and throughout his regime, Fujimori
captured the votes and interests of women from both high and low socio-economic statuses and
made advances in women’s representation in the public sphere and, more generally, in women’s
rights (Blondet, 2002; Rousseau, 2006). Ultimately, despite the highly controversial authoritarian
manner that Fujimori used to prolong his time in office, women—and not only those in the upper
echelon of society—were encouraged to participate in both political and social spheres of life in
ways that prior they had not been encouraged to do. In this way, their contributions to their
communities, which had often been overlooked, became recognized, valued, and encouraged.
Interestingly, while comparatively higher levels of women vied for office in the 1998 municipal
elections, their political aims were not united and consequently they did not achieve high
representation in that year (Blondet, 2002). In conclusion, then, the joint efforts and synergy of
women’s local movements—as described in the above section—and substantive actions toward
expanding women’s roles under Fujimori’s regime suggest that Peru’s institutional legacy is
more complex than it may appear. Taking the sole lens of considering women’s advancement at
this time, it does appear that women were able to gain greater access to public and social spaces
from which they were previously barred and subsequently wielded power in their local
communities to create some social change. These dual forces will contrast with the historical
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context of Russia’s communism, within which local movements were kept weak and national
elite did not produce substantive actions toward women’s rights.
Since the implementation of gender quotas beginning in the late 1990s on both the
national and subnational level, Peru’s gender quotas are decidedly an instrumental factor in
buttressing women’s subnational presence (Valdés & Palacios, 1999; “Women,” n.d.). Such
trends reflect some degree of institutionalized mechanisms on the part of these governments,
more broadly signifying their stance toward advancing and prioritizing women’s rights. In
addition to national-level legislative quotas, Peru is one of the few Latin American countries
today to have gender quota laws on the municipal level (Valdés & Palacios, 1999). Implemented
in the late 1990s, this quota mandates that candidate lists for regional and municipal legislatures
be at least 30% women (International IDEA, Inter-Parliamentary Union, & Stockholm
University, eds., 2016; Htun & Piscopo, 2014). After this municipal quota was established,
“female candidates enjoyed unprecedented success in the country’s 1998 municipal elections . . .
greater than in most other Latin American elections” (Schmidt & Saunders, 2004, p. 705). In
addition to subnational elections, today municipal governments like that of Callao have
committed to ensuring that 30% of those serving “in neighborhood boards, electoral committees,
and public works commissions” are women (United Nations, 2004, p. 17). Progress on the
subnational level has occurred because of these quotas, although women’s representation is still
lower than that on the national level. Government reports that trace the local progress made
toward gender equality show that from 1995-8, “only 8% of elected councilors were women,
while in 1998-2002 this figure rose to 24%” (United Nations, 2004, p. 17). This notable
percentage jump in women’s representation reflects that once gender quotas were implemented,
subnational political positions were made more accessible for women to enter and gain visibility.
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Furthermore, it is helpful to note that “for the period 2003-2006 five women have been elected
out of a total of 194 city mayors, 26% of municipal councilors are women, and 49 women have
been elected as district mayors (of a total of 1624)” (United Nations, 2004, p. 15). While such
progress is certainly uneven across a country as diverse as Peru, research has overall “found that
the implementation of gender quotas is one of the main drivers of women’s representation”
across the region of Latin America (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015, p. 5). Success of gender
quotas in the region also exemplifies the expanse and success of diffusion (Escobar-Lemmon &
Funk, 2015).
In conclusion, gender quotas, along with a specific set of electoral structures, all work to
promote women’s subnational representation in Peru. Though perhaps controversial, Peru’s
historical institutional legacy of authoritarianism also appears to have promoted women’s
representation, as Fujimori’s administration advocated for and supported women’s advancement
in the public sphere. I will now shift toward focusing on decentralization’s effects on women’s
subnational presence in this country.
Application of theory to Peru: Decentralization analysis
The theoretical framework outlined at the beginning of this paper anticipates that
decentralization reforms may serve as both a window of opportunity and a deterrent for women’s
representation in subnational politics and is thus a political institution that depends largely on the
intersection of cultural, social, and political factors within a country. The following sections
show the positive and negative effects of decentralization within Peru and how decentralization
mingles with other existing social and political forces to shape women’s presence.
Broadly speaking, the presence of women in municipal-level positions of politics is one
way in which women can exercise greater agency and influence in important political processes.
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Research has shown that these positions are a “particularly favourable environment for women to
act in, as they are closely linked to the day-to-day life of the community” (Valdés & Palacios,
1999, p. 49). Yet on a global scale, the United Nations reports that “female elected councilors are
underrepresented in all regions of the world and female mayors even more so” (Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2010, p. x). Although progress in heightening women’s
representation in these positions has been made in both Peru and Russia, it is important to note
that their representation still significantly trails that of men, most especially on the subnational
level. Research indicates that mayoral and gubernatorial positions in Peru inherit more power,
influence, and financial autonomy; consequently, holding these positions allow one to “control
local budgets (political “pork”) . . . as a result, competition for these positions is fierce” (Htun &
Piscopo, p. 6). As established above, this competition is gendered and disproportionately
disadvantages women (Valdés & Palacios, 1999). In 1998, for example, just 7 women out of 194
politicians served as mayor (Valdés & Palacios, 1999). More broadly across Latin America,
while progress is uneven, statistics show that women occupy about 9% of mayoral positions
(Htun & Piscopo, 2014). There has notably been improvement in the representation of women in
these positions in this region, having held “some 5 percent of mayors” when compared between
1990 and 2000 (Htun & Piscopo, p. 6).
In addition, the percentage of women mayors in Latin America significantly trails the
percentage of women in subnational legislative positions (Htun & Piscopo, 2014). Yet in the
legislative sphere, women are often placed on committees that are seen as being less influential
and thus less important in the policy arena (UNDP, 2013). In a regional comparison, countries in
Central America and the Caribbean have women in mayoral positions “ranging from 20% to
37%,” which sharply contrasts with both Peru’s 9% (Valdés & Palacios, 1999, p. 48) and
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Russia’s (approximate) 5%. Therefore, while mayoral positions are some of the most influential
positions of power in the subnational realm and thus represent a critical space in which women
may be able to exercise agency and influence, statistics reflect that both Peru and Russia
encounter formidable challenges to women’s representation in contemporary times.
As Peru came out of a decade-long dictatorship and asserted its renewed commitment to
democratization starting in 2001, it has since widely experienced continuous processes of
decentralization (United Nations, 2004). The government has notably drawn distinct connections
between implementing decentralization reforms and alleviating poverty, as they believe that
these reforms empower the largely female impoverished communities by offering them local
positions of influence (United Nations, 2004). In this vein, Peru established the Decentralization
Act, which “promote[s] human development and the progressive and sustained improvement of
living conditions for overcoming poverty,” with the implicit understanding that women
experience greater levels of poverty than men (United Nations, 2004, p. 3). Furthermore,
decentralization policies such as the Municipalities Act represent additional efforts made toward
“preventing discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, religion or gender, and any other form of
discrimination” (United Nations, 2004, p. 6). As established above, it appears that Peru does not
lack the written legal mechanisms and policies that portray its commitment to supporting
women’s access to subnational spaces of decision-making.
Yet what is problematic is that institutional mechanisms that promise “women’s
participation in the decentralization processes” are sparse (United Nations, 2004, p. 6). While the
government has explicitly identified this as being an issue in its 2004 report to the United
Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, it demonstrates an emphasis on showcasing
written commitments of equality, especially to placate the international community, and less on
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steadily achieving the objectives (United Nations, 2004). The Peruvian state also identifies the
problem of not giving sufficient funds and “resources . . . to promote equal opportunity for
women” on the subnational level; dismal funds then serve as a formidable financial barrier for
women to access political office (United Nations, 2004, p. 5). This financial issue is also
mentioned as hindering the potential impact that women and gender-specific policies can have in
the political realm.
The Peruvian government recently found that the “expansion of municipal powers and
the transfer of funding needed to fulfill their role in promoting local development” are crucial
steps toward achieving effective political decentralization and women’s representation (United
Nations, 2004, p. 20). Therefore, the recurring issue of allocation of funds and limited
subnational autonomy in decision-making processes may be said to inhibit women’s full
representation in this arena. At the same time, processes of decentralization have resulted in “an
increase in resources at this [subnational] level, as well as in public visibility and political
interest” (Valdés & Palacios, 1999, p. 49). This political dynamic increases the competitiveness
of these positions, diminishing the access to opportunity for women in occupying positions of
power. Therefore, as a recent UNDP report found, “Greater quantities of resources would not
necessarily seem to produce environments of greater equality but, on the contrary, would seem to
characterize a process of institutional inequality-building where men reserve the most coveted of
positions” (UNDP, 2013, p. 57). Therefore, one notices the double-edged sword in increasing
municipal-level influence and power, which problematizes how to most effectively ensure that
women access positions of influence in their communities, ones that are meaningful and offer
them the structural conditions to generate substantive policy-making and decision-making
outcomes.
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Russia’s government
This paper now shifts toward an analysis of Russia’s political system and subnational
representation of women. Understanding more broadly the trajectory of governance across
Eastern Europe provides a context for examining the current government structure of Russia. I
will then discuss the social and political theoretical conditions in Russia’s case before shifting
the attention to decentralization’s effects and its relationship with women’s representation.
Numerous countries across Eastern Europe have historically been dominated by
communist or authoritarian political systems that prevented significant autonomy at the
subnational level (Pitschel & Bauer, 2009). Similar to Latin America, widespread
decentralization processes diffused across Eastern Europe during the 1990s, although to
significantly different degrees (Pitschel & Bauer, 2009). These reforms were also linked to
building democracy in this region and sparked hope among many that these governments could
finally leave behind their communist pasts (Pitschel and Bauer, 2009). Yet as was the case in
Latin America, some challenges arose with associating democracy with decentralization.
Specifically, many countries in Eastern Europe—most notably Russia—have since not followed
a linear and swift path to democracy, despite initially successful decentralization reforms
(Johnson & Saarinen, 2013). Today, we see that Russia is “a federation consisting of territorial
units the number of which decreased from 89 in 2002 to 83 in 2012” (Golosov, 2013, p. 87). This
number is noticeably greater than Peru’s units, of which there are 25. The significant corruption
in both national and subnational political bodies across Russia and the country’s gradual retreat
into authoritarianism provide a most interesting political landscape to compare alongside that of
Peru to further analyze those conditions that should promote women’s subnational representation
(Gel’man & Ross, 2010; Hoxie, 1994). Furthermore, scholars have suggested that Russia’s
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experience with political and fiscal decentralization, which began in the 1990s after the fall of
the Soviet Union, resulted in a much different model than the democratic one that was expected.
Indeed, decentralization processes in Russia that occurred in the late twentieth and early twentyfirst century have resembled much more the “feudalism” or “clientelism” model (Chang, 2010, p.
128). This insight is important to highlight, as it differs from Peru’s model of decentralization,
which adheres much more to the liberal democratic framework. This difference also helps us to
understand why we see a relatively stable democracy in Peru today, whereas in Russia we
observe the emergence of a hybrid regime in which some democratic dimensions linger but
which increasingly showcases authoritarian elements (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Gel’man, 2015).
Though not to the extent of the Peruvian state, the Russian state formally establishes
gender equality as a priority; accountability and implementation of this commitment, similar to
Peru, continue to serve as dual challenges. The Russian Constitution explicitly mentions equal
rights and opportunity for men and women, and it has often in the past participated in initiatives
from the United Nations that promote equality, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). It appears, however, that the Russian state’s commitment to gender equality
and women’s issues lies largely in the international realm and is rarely found in practice on
neither the national nor regional level, both in terms of policies and budgets for gender issues
(Zakirova, 2014). One recent study looking at decentralization and subnational governance in the
region of Bashkortostan found that “no systematic participatory planning, let alone planning that
is gender-sensitive, has taken place” (Zakirova, 2014, p. 202). Whereas the Peruvian state
ministries have dictated that “regional budgets should be evaluated from a gender perspective”
(Salazar, 2011, para. 29) but have not outlined explicitly how to implement this aim, the Russian
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state ministries have not made any comparable mandates and discourage attempts by regional
governments to allocate budgeting toward gender issues. It was only in 2000 that Putin briefly
acknowledged the absence of women in the political realm; however, subsequent appointments
thereafter both on the national and subnational level did not showcase notable numbers of
women holding political positions (Nechemias, 2000). Overall, women’s issues and rights have
not been considered a statewide priority since arguably Soviet times (Zakirova, 2014).
It may also be insightful to mention that a presence of women in subnational positions
can at times translate into larger numbers in the national arena, which in turn gives women
greater access to decision-making processes within their communities and on a more global
scale. In Peru, some studies have shown that women occupy more subnational positions than
national positions; at the same time, however, levels of subnational representation in Peru and
more broadly Latin America are still significantly low (Valdés & Palacios, 1999). In Russia,
national-level appointments are made by President Putin and a few political elite, and the few
female appointments that are made often come from women candidates who hold subnational
positions (Nechemias, 2000). Scholars generally conclude that women’s advancements in the
national political domain are much sparser than those in the subnational domain, that is, women
have in the past decades been better able to access positions of political power on the subnational
level (Nechemias, 2000). Such a finding suggests that in Russia’s case, women who occupy
subnational roles may not find sufficient access to advance onwards to the national realm. One
rationale for this could be seen in Gibson’s (2013) concept of “parochialization of power,” which
he defines as “local strategies of political control” (p. 24). Female candidates may find greater
access points in which to partake in these processes of gaining power on the local level, whereas
they cannot gain this same level of access on the national level. Furthermore, the national
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political realm also means “short tenures in office, a lack of insider status, and the treatment of
women as secondary rather than central actors” for women, which may pose as additional
rationale as to why subnational units may be more accessible for women’s representation
(Necehmias, 2000, p. 202). The connections made between women occupying subnational office
and national office should be explored further in future studies. The insights found in this
paragraph point to the myriad political forces that create dissonance in representation between
the subnational and national level.
Application of theory to Russia: Social conditions analysis
Researchers argue that the social and cultural milieu in Russia is deeply patriarchal and
that this patriarchy infiltrates the political system, work force, and private life to inhibit women’s
entry into the political sphere (Zakirova, 2014). I find that local women’s movements in Russia
are only effective in influencing women’s entry in subnational office when supported publicly by
female politicians; furthermore, in contrast to Peru’s movements, those in Russia remain
apolitical. Furthermore, whereas in Peru, traditional machista or sexist gender norms and
attitudes are becoming less widespread in the more developed urban centers, this dissonance
between rural versus urban regions has not developed in Russia. Instead, although women made
some strides in the late twentieth century, Russia’s turn toward authoritarianism has occurred in
tandem with a reinforcement of the traditional patriarchy (Zakirova, 2014). Lastly, as is similar
in Peru, no subnational political party ideologies have emerged that prioritize women’s rights in
Russia, and ideology itself is diminishing in significance as the local male political elite garner
more power and control within the political processes. This analysis will ultimately reinforce the
commonly-made conclusion that in Russia, “at its deepest level, the generally low level of
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women’s representation is due to the fact that society has not placed a priority on gender
equality” (Moser, 2003, p. 17).
Local women’s movements have at times helped women in Russia gain subnational
office, however, they are relatively weak and struggle to exert influence. Because of the
communist structure in place for much of the twentieth century, women’s movements and
organizations were not even allowed to publicly exist until the late 1980s. The reason behind this
lies within the fabric of communism itself such that “the state sought to control the issue of
women's rights just as it did all other social issues” (“Russia,” 1995, para. 5). Whereas Peru’s
local women’s movements gained traction in the 1980s and later helped to facilitate the country’s
transition to democracy, Russian women’s movements in the 1980s and onward struggled to gain
social acceptance and a foothold in their communities. Indeed, “throughout the 1990s feminist
organisations in Moscow and St Petersburg have been perceived by grass roots provincial
women as arrogant theorists alien to their basic concerns” (Shevchenko, 2002, p. 1219). In
contemporary times, besides the notable exception of the women’s crisis center movement, most
local movements are still not wholly integrated in society because of deep-seated social stigmas
and attitudes toward them stemming from communist times (Johnson & Saarinen, 2013). Of
note, some Russian female politicians have often used local women’s movements to their
political advantage. For example, some head the movements themselves, whereas others
establish “alliances for lobbying purposes” among these movements, and still others at least
attribute their position of political influence to the advances made by these movements
(Nechemias, 2000, p. 204). Such findings demonstrate that the local women’s movements, while
they do not gain national-level attention, do play a role in how local female politicians view
themselves or position themselves in their community. In other words, women’s movements are
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not entirely irrelevant in modern Russia, although they have in recent years become more limited
due to broader social stigmas toward pro-women or feminist activities, which is explained in
more detail below, as well as internal divisions within the movements themselves (Nechemias,
2000). It appears that it depends on whether the female politician decides to collaborate with the
women’s movement, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, the women’s movement as
a lone actor “has been ineffective in mobilizing demand for female candidates,” largely due to
the apolitical nature of these movements and negative social attitudes toward them (Moser, 2003,
p. 164). We will see below the conditions that may intertwine with these women’s movements to
render them weak and unable of pushing women into subnational office.
Since the turn of the century, mainstream social and cultural norms in Russia have
reverted to traditional patriarchal attitudes and roles. The social realm is largely unsupportive of
any efforts that can be portrayed as “feminist,” and there has been a resurgence toward
promoting traditional gender norms and roles in both the private and public sphere (Hesli, Jung,
Reisinger, & Miller, 2001, p. 42). We see that progress toward women’s representation in the
political sphere remained stagnant throughout the last decade of the twentieth century for a
plethora of interconnecting social factors, including “the image of women as belonging to the
domestic sphere, the association of feminism with negative aspects of Communist social
organization, and the lack of grassroots support for organizations that should serve as advocates
for women’s interests” (Hesli et al., 2001, p. 42). In contemporary Russia, subnational and
national authorities alike reflect “patriarchal assumptions that women’s place is in the home with
traditional gender roles” (Zakirova, 2014, p. 209). Patriarchal gender norms and behaviors are
normalized, reinforcing a patriarchal private sphere and masculine political realm (Hesli et al.,
2001). Russia’s structural patriarchy mirrors the machismo culture of Peru, both of which hinder
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women’s agency and voice in the halls of government. These social and cultural norms pervade
across Russia’s social and political landscape and strongly influence the stagnancy of local
women’s movements and party ideologies, the latter of which is discussed below, as well as the
representation of women in subnational political office.
Historically, political party ideologies in Russia have not advocated for women’s
representation on the national or subnational level. As anticipated, “Over time, ideology has
apparently emerged as a significant factor influencing how well a party will represent women”
(Moser, 2003, p. 19). Even more so than Peru’s case, no subnational parties in Russia exist on
either the left or right that advocate for women’s rights (Kiryukhina, 2013). Just as Peru’s
subnational political parties have autonomy in forming their policy platforms separate from those
on the national level, Russian subnational parties “develop their own routines and strategies”
(Sätre, 2014, p. 27). Yet in both cases, their platforms ignore the integration of women’s rights
and issues. Generally across Eastern Europe, conservative political parties often “explicitly
advocated the traditional roles of homemaker and mother for women rather than endorsing
policies in support of women’s and family interests” after communism fell and still today
(Rueschemeyer, 2015, p. 156). As turned out to be the case in Peru, even those parties perceived
as being leftist in this region do not always “incorporate a women’s agenda into their programs,”
although they have typically been known to advocate for abortion rights (Rueschemeyer, 2015,
p. 158). Russian women during their lifetime alone have witnessed their interests and concerns
no longer being a priority by the state nor represented in party platforms. Of interest, research
suggests that since the mid 2000s, subnational parties compete less as left, right, or center parties
and more so as “nonpartisan,” the reason being that they are dominated by tight-knit linkages
among the political local male elite (Gel’man, 2015, p. 85).
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Concerning the few times when women in Russia were represented by political parties,
research has shown that “parties . . . sought to manipulate women voters through largely
symbolic measures, such as highlighting “their” woman as part of their electoral strategy, rather
than bring women into the inner halls of power” (Nechemias, 2000, p. 216). Russia’s political
parties then pursued an ideological belief of women as tokenistic and not as capable of
occupying notable decision- and policy-making roles. Rather than viewing women as equal
agents, women were merely a “symbol of the party’s concern” (Nechemias, 2000, p. 209). We
see then that this largely symbolic status for women in Russia may mirror that for women in
Peru. In both cultural contexts, women are not encouraged by their respective political parties on
the subnational level to enter office, nor do these parties develop inclusive policy agendas to
address gender-specific issues.
Overall, processes of diffusion do not seem to have noticeably advanced Russian
women’s presence in subnational politics. Subnational political party ideologies are influenced
by the local political elite and broader gendered power structures that exclude women and are not
affected by more liberal political movements norms that have emerged and spread across Europe.
The below discussion of the stagnancy with quotas reiterates that diffusion has not been
successful in Russia, even though countries across East, Central, and South Eastern Europe have
adopted gender quotas. The Russian political domain overall remains largely unmoved by such
steps toward greater gender equality in the political domain (Krook, 2004).
Application of theory to Russia: Political institutions analysis
I now apply the theoretical political conditions to Russia’s case. The electoral conditions
that should promote women’s presence, including proportional representation structures and free
and fair elections, are not effective in promoting women’s subnational representation or do not
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exist in the Russian political system. Higher party and district magnitude, however, do hold merit
in this cultural context. Russia’s historical institutional legacy of communism has helped to
entrench women’s roles in the private sphere and thus challenges women’s access to subnational
office. In contrast to Peru, Russia has not implemented subnational nor national gender quotas
since 1990. The following paragraphs elucidate these findings.
Russia and Peru’s electoral structures yield somewhat different results for their influence
on women’s subnational representation. First, in direct contrast to Peru’s PR system, the most
recent—and perhaps only—full-length study on Russia’s PR process shows that the PR system
in Russia does not have a positive effect on getting women elected (Moser, 2003). As a helpful
side note, previous studies have already suggested that PR systems do not operate well under
authoritarianism, as these two notions in effect contradict one another (Golosov, 2013). In
Russia, the PR system used in subnational elections has been observed as having a harmful
effect, whereas the plurality system instead has proven to be a better vehicle for women to gain a
voice: “Significantly more women have been elected under the plurality half of Russia’s mixed
electoral system” (Moser, 2003, p. 2). This finding then reflects dissonance with research
findings that the PR system is beneficial for women on the subnational level. As discussed
above, the support or demand from broader society and women’s movements were largely absent
during communist times and in contemporary times simply do not exert great influence. As a
result, political parties “have little incentive, strategically or normatively, to nominate women in
favorable PR slots” (Moser, 2003, pp. 17-8). Another aspect of the electoral system is its levels
of party and district magnitude, which in theory promote women’s subnational representation.
Both Peru and Russia are similar in that they struggle with establishing strong political systems
and party identification (Moser, 2003). For Russia, “endemic party fragmentation has tended to
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hinder female representation in the PR tier by lowering party magnitude,” a condition which then
allows men to dominate the “top slots on party lists” (Moser, 2003, p. 5). Therefore, men quickly
end up occupying those positions so that subnational parties cannot select those female
candidates whose names are typically found toward the bottom of party lists (Moser, 2003).
Research thus shows that low party magnitude has occurred often throughout Russia’s history
and barred women’s access to subnational office. Furthermore, political parties are typically
responsible for nominating their candidates and thus have often chosen “to constrain female
candidates” in the proportional representation districts of the political system (Moser, 2003, p.
6). The other half of Russia’s system is single-member district, in which curiously enough,
female candidates have in the past twenty years won seats at higher rates on the regional level
than those candidates in PR districts (Moser, 2003). These findings suggest that women in
subnational politics are not better off in PR systems and do not have the comfort of competing in
districts with high party and district magnitudes. Lastly, the past decade has shown that most
subnational governments across Russia can be considered as “electoral authoritarian systems”
and thus do not qualify as having “fully free and fair elections” (Saikkonen, 2016, p. 438).
Whereas research posits that free and fair elections support women’s subnational representation,
the political context in Russia suggests that some of the country’s electoral structures still serve
as barriers to women’s representation.
It is also paramount to identify the interconnections between Russia’s historical
institutional legacy and women’s subnational representation. Carol Nechemias (2000) describes
the role that “historical continuity” plays in Russia today and reflects that “much in
contemporary Russian society, including barriers to women’s political participation, reflects ties
with the past” (p. 199). She goes on to examine how communism “undermined respect for
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women . . . by including them primarily as symbolic figures in symbolic institutions, the soviets
(councils or legislatures)” (p. 214). This finding resonates and aligns with a broader observation
implicated throughout this paper, one in which women have traditionally been construed as
symbols rather than actual equal contributors in the political and social spheres. This nationallevel myth-making project also “presented women with the double burden of a profession and a
domestic role as caretaker of the family and home” (Moser, 2003, p. 3), which created intense
social pressure for women and helps to further contextualize their modern resistance to women’s
movements, feminist discourses, etc. Today, Russian society today has little familiarity with
women occupying notable positions of decision-making power or influence in the public sphere.
Overall, “this [Communist] legacy has produced a set of social, cultural, and economic
conditions that have undermined women's ability to pursue elected office” (Moser, 2003, p. 3).
This institutional legacy not only keeps women out of political positions on both the subnational
and national levels, but also deters important steps from being made to improve women’s
representation, as detailed below in discussing the low support for quotas.
In contrast to Peru’s implementation of and success with gender quotas, Russia has not
implemented gender quotas on any level of governance since 1990, in part due to its communist
legacy (International IDEA, n.d.). Indeed, studies indicate that right after the government
dismantled the gender quota system that year, it “led to an unprecedented decline in women's
representation in the Russian legislature” (International IDEA, n.d., para. 5). During the era of
the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) perpetuated the idea of
creating an egalitarian society and initially instituted a legislative gender quota (Nechemias,
2000). This quota applied only to the subnational level, specifically in “soviets” or councils
(Hesli, Jung, Reisinger, & Miller, 2001, p. 44). However, this system constructed images of
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women as “symbolic figures in symbolic institutions” (Nechemias, 2000, p. 214). In effect, they
were given little agency in important decision-making processes and were unable to accomplish
much in their positions. The few policy arenas they had some influence in were those that were
typically perceived as “compassion issues,” such as caring for children, the elderly, and the poor
(Nechemias, 2000, p. 201).
Broadly speaking, Eastern Europe implemented gender quotas in their respective political
systems during the final years of communism in the early 1990s (Rueschemeyer, 2015). Once
again, however, “this representation was largely symbolic . . . women were barely represented in
the apparatus of the party and state, where real power lay” (Rueschemeyer, 2015, p. 152). Thus,
descriptive representation on both the national and subnational levels was challenging to
accomplish in the recent history of this region. Furthermore, this superficial inclusion of women
in the political realm aligns with our observations during the times of the former Soviet Union. A
dominant social belief both after communism fell and still today is that those policy concerns
deemed as women’s issues should not take priority until other “critical issues” are addressed,
which devalues and renders irrelevant women’s issues as occupying space within the political
realm (Rueschemeyer, 2015, p. 156).
Application of theory to Russia: Decentralization
Some scholars have noted the sparse literature about decentralization and local politics in
Russia and more broadly the post-Soviet space, even though dynamic changes have occurred in
these spaces in recent decades and are thus worthy of academic attention (Chang, 2010). Because
of the insufficient literature that is readily accessible on the topic, this section relies heavily on a
few notable sources that focus on Russian women’s representation in decentralized subnational
spaces.
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Dual forces of decentralization and recentralization have reflected a bitter and constantly
evolving power struggle in Russia today. Between the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
Putin’s rise to power in 2000, numerous steps were taken toward decentralizing the country’s
political realm (Zakirova, 2014), which was representative of broader processes pervading
Eastern Europe (Andrews & de Vries, 2007). Efforts at decentralization aligned with the brief
opening of Russia’s economy and granted greater autonomy to subnational political units.
However, since 2000, President Putin has embarked on a political strategy of vertical integration,
which is defined as being a “hierarchical spatial organisation of power with a single chain of
command extending from the federal centre . . . to the level of local government” (Golosov,
Gushchina, & Kononenko, 2016, p. 511). Consequently, Russia is often seen as an example of
authoritarian consolidation (Levitsky & Way, 2010). For example, the Russian government has
limited the autonomy and actions of political parties, as well as mayoral and gubernatorial
positions across the country (Gel’man, 2015). This national centralization strategy also resulted
in the “abolition of gubernatorial elections,” so that governors today are selected directly by the
state (Monaghan, 2011, p. 8). When some social unrest occurred during the 2012 national
elections, Putin successfully shut them down and has since proceeded to further “tighten the
screws” on the freedoms and decision-making power of subnational institutions (Gel’man, 2015,
p. 124). Today, the idea that “order should be associated to centralization, while disorder to
decentralization” strongly characterizes the political climate on the national level (Andrews & de
Vries, 2007, p. 16).
At the same time, centralization has not occurred as successfully as Putin and his political
elite have imagined. Many of Russia’s regions today remain untouched by the national vertical
integration policies and are thus decentralized and able to exert some autonomy (Herrington,
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2002). Furthermore, some studies show that decentralization diminishes the power of national
political parties “by fragmenting the institutional framework of political competition” (Vergara,
2011, p. 2), a pattern that we also noticed in Peru. Despite Putin’s coercion, subnational units
across the country significantly vary “in terms of resources, state capacity and democratization,
and their relative strength and autonomy in relation to central government” (Moscovich, 2015, p.
5). Ultimately, recentralization and decentralization reforms are in a constant power struggle,
such that “recentralization moves in Russia seem to be driven mostly by a political confrontation
between the central administration and the regional governments and republics” (Andrews & de
Vries, 2007, p. 16). As a result, marginalized groups such as women are caught in and affected
by this power struggle and ultimately are the actors who suffer the consequences of an unstable
and constantly changing political system. Women’s entry into the subnational political realm is
especially challenging to navigate due to this uncertain and fluid environment. Statistics, such as
women holding less than 5% of mayoral positions, reflect the structural challenges they face
(Buckley, Garifullina, Reuter, & Shubenkova, 2014).
Keeping this fluid political context in mind, this paper finds that decentralized units
across Russia have in fact served to some degree as an access point to represent female
candidates and provide them the agency to engage in a spectrum of day-to-day responsibilities.
In this way, women are constantly countering and re-negotiating dominant gendered power
structures. At the same time, some of the decentralized structures of these subnational
governments themselves pose several lasting challenges to female politicians.
Because of previous decentralization reforms, Russian subnational politicians “are
subject to an increased responsibility for job creation and survival at the local level” (Sätre,
2014, p. 28). This insight suggests that new spaces are being created across decentralized
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subnational units that allow local politicians to exert their own decision-making power and
influence. If women accessed subnational office, then they too have an opportunity to engage in
these economic and social responsibilities. Subnational units though are often faced with tackling
issues of entrenched poverty within their communities—similar to issues with which Peruvian
subnational governments have been tasked—and this realm of responsibility is often shifted to
female local politicians in office (Sätre, 2014). Reserving this policy domain for female
politicians on both the subnational and national level not surprisingly stems from the country’s
influential Soviet past, in which “social policy was predominantly a female responsibility”
(Sätre, 2014, p. 28). In this case, it appears that Russian women are tasked with gendered work
activities if they end up occupying subnational office.
Decentralized subnational units in Russia also suffer from insufficient funds, similar to
Peru’s case, and no funds have been allocated toward gender-related policy issues (Sätre, 2014).
The ongoing issues of insufficient funds in the lower tiers of government is therefore a
formidable barrier to women’s ability to access political office in both Peru and Russia. Indeed,
budgets can be so dismal in Russia’s decentralized governments that female politicians have
ended up taking from their own salaries to contribute to their work (Sätre, 2014). Furthermore,
decentralized political units cannot exert as much autonomy and decision-making power as they
otherwise might be able to because of the aforementioned power struggle with the national elite.
Researchers have concluded, for example, that most of Russia’s subnational political units hold
elections that do not qualify as wholly free and fair. Consequently, “most Russian subnational
cases can be classified as electoral authoritarian between 1991 and 2005,” which in turn indicates
that elections are dominated by local elite and reflect the “subnational (non)competitiveness”
within the electoral process (Saikkonen, 2016, p. 437). As a point of comparison, Peruvian
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female candidates are often pushed out of their respective decentralized political units from
increased competitiveness because of the additional resources and funds said units receive from
the national government (Escobar-Lemmon & Funk, 2015; Valdés & Palacios, 1999). Yet in
Russia’s case, subnational electoral processes are not competitive and decentralized governments
are not given adequate resources, which are dual challenges that may challenge women’s ability
to gain a voice in politics.
In response to dismal funding in decentralized units in Russia, subnational female
politicians exercise innovative and often informal mechanisms of power and decision-making
within their positions. For example, “local [female] politicians use their entrepreneurial skills to
compensate for inadequate financial resources” (Sätre, 2014, p. 39). In this sense, then, Russian
female politicians use creative methods to ensure that they still prompt change in their respective
communities, despite the constraints they face structurally and financially. Their strategies
include starting or supporting local women’s councils, clubs, businesses, and trade unions (Sätre,
2014). This insight suggests that although Russian women similarly face financial restraints in
decentralized spaces—which mirrors the reality for female politicians in Peru—Russian women
have found alternative methods to exert political agency in their positions, which entail creating
new groups or initiatives within the community. These signs of entrepreneurship are reminiscent
of women’s activities during the Soviet times, when they were tasked with a range of activities
both inside and outside the home and thus learned special skills to help them survive and
contribute to their communities. Furthermore, it is interesting that these entrepreneurial efforts
are led and carried through by women; research does not mention any contribution on the part of
their male counterparts, which may suggest greater agency and decision-making power on the
part of women in these decentralized spaces than what initially appears. Such trends also suggest
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the ability for women to re-negotiate the gendered power dynamics within decentralized spaces.
Lastly, subnational female politicians’ creative forms of power point to a broader trend in
decentralized political spaces across Russia. That is, “due to the central government’s lack of
strategy in regard to local governments, regional governors and presidents of Russian republics
have created their own rules in regard to municipalities and villages” (Andrews & de Vries,
2007, p. 16). In this sense, while decentralized subnational governments may not have adequate
resources nor complete autonomy, they at the same time are afforded some leeway and little
oversight. Indeed, one scholar mentions that “there are now new possibilities for individuals and
local firms thanks to an access to resources, along with central funds for local development and
social programs, from which the local level can apply for resources” (Sätre, 2014, p. 30).
Decentralization has thus created entirely new yet still gendered dynamics within the political
structures of these subnational governments, in turn perhaps encouraging women to run and
certainly opening up possibilities for female leaders once in power to exert a range of informal
political strategies.
Subnational female politicians have also developed “bargaining strategies” to request
money from a variety of informal actors, including their constituents, as well as volunteering in
their communities (Sätre, 2014, p. 43). Decentralization reforms have created then additional
space in which female leaders use agency within their positions to support their communities
despite dismal budgets. Russian women have noted that they have enhanced their social and
interpersonal communication skills, as they have had to reach out to and gain the confidence of
actors who can contribute funds to their subnational governments. This skillset in turn can make
them more competitive candidates for future positions at least in their communities, since I
earlier found that they do not typically advance to the national realm. However, because some of
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these interpersonal strategies include “begging,” particularly when appealing to small businesses
for donations, this practice may undermine women’s decision-making power, even increase local
corruption, and perpetuate gendered power structures and the male power elite (Sätre, 2014, p.
43). Indeed, the “begging” practices are representative of deeply entrenched gendered discourses
in Russian political processes because female politicians in Russia operate within a patriarchal
system and thus must seek the help and financial support of “more prominent male entrepreneurs
to provide work places and social services” (Sätre, 2014, p. 43). It also appears more common
for Russian subnational female politicians to develop these informal mechanisms of power and
influence in their communities, as opposed to female politicians in Peru, because of the distinct
effects of decentralization across Russia.
Furthermore, Russian women face even less institutionalized mechanisms to support
them in accessing office and yielding formal political power while in office; decentralization
reforms have not noticeably resulted in the implementation of institutional mechanisms to
promote women’s subnational representation. Similar to Peru’s case, decentralization reforms in
Russia have not integrated “mechanisms needed for them to work” (Sätre, 2014, p. 43). In both
cultural contexts, no institutional policies are in place to support women’s entry in subnational
office. In Russia, subnational politicians are financially constrained from allocating budget funds
to support marginalized groups like women, the poor, and people with disabilities (Sätre, 2014).
This financial disorganization and potential mismanagement could in turn affect the ability of
female politicians to act effectively as entrepreneurs, as well as the longevity and reach of the
policy projects they initiate in their governments.
Indeed, one study that discussed this multifaceted topic is notable in highlighting the
uneven and potentially negative effects of decentralization on women’s representation. A
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regression analysis was done that measured the effects of decentralization in several countries,
including Russia, and surveyed local politicians’ inclination to engage their constituents and
views on their autonomy within their decentralized units. This study concluded that, in contrast
to countries like Sweden or Brazil where local leaders are apt to integrate their constituents in
political processes and thus demonstrate the positive effects of decentralization, “in a country
like Russia, however, increasing local autonomy will have a negative effect on involving societal
groups. This becomes even more pronounced when we take into account intervening variables
which might influence the impact of decentralization on public participation” (Andrews & de
Vries, 2007, p. 21). This study further argued “that decentralization is not sensible in this
country, because it diminishes the inclination among local elites to involve societal groups and
citizens in the local policy making process” (Andrews & de Vries, 2007, p. 21). As pointed out
above, most subnational elections are noncompetitive and controlled by the male elite
establishment. In this vein, this trend in these subnational spaces “confirms the arguments by
Rondinelli et al. (1983) that decentralization often serves as an instrument for achieving political
objectives” (Andrews & de Vries, 2007, p. 22). This finding may narrow the access that women
have in reaching subnational office, although further research on this topic is needed. Overall,
this study expressed disapproval at making subnational spaces across Russia more decentralized
because it actually may bar marginalized groups like women from gaining a voice in important
political processes.
Conclusion
This research paper has attempted to identify which political and social conditions
positively shape the descriptive representation of women across subnational units. A number of
insights to help answer this question have been explored at length and will be briefly
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summarized as follows, followed by some final thoughts on this research topic.
This research found that the following social conditions promote women’s descriptive
representation in subnational politics: active local women’s movements; less
traditional/patriarchal cultural and social norms; widespread diffusion; and pro-women political
party ideologies. In Peru, local women’s movements have become active since the 1980s, many
of which have had political aims and spurred greater subnational presence of women.
Traditionally sexist cultural and social norms in Peru still hinder women’s subnational
representation, which appears to be more common in rural areas and less so in major urban
centers. This machismo is often embedded in and reinforced by religious beliefs and poverty
cycles, all of which entrench Peruvian women in subordinate roles and challenge their ability to
access spaces of political power. Notably, the social condition of pro-women or leftist political
party ideology may not translate into more women holding subnational office in Peru, although
further research to support this idea is recommended. Party ideology does not hold as much
relevance as anticipated, as subnational parties across the political spectrum construct political
agendas different from their national counterparts because of decentralization reforms, yet have
given little policy priority to the advancement of women’s rights, especially in the political
realm. This trend can be partially attributed to the gendered power structures salient in
subnational governments.
Comparing these social conditions to Russia, I found that women’s movements appeared
to be noticeably effective only when supported publicly or bolstered by female subnational
politicians, which was not commonplace. In contrast to Peru’s movements, Russian women’s
movements are apolitical in contemporary times and do not appear to significantly factor into
promoting greater representation of women in subnational politics. Russian society and culture
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still rest heavily on patriarchal binary gender roles for men and women, which has also
challenged the existence of strong women’s movements and pro-women party ideologies.
Whereas in Peru, overtly machista gender norms and attitudes are becoming less widespread at
least in the more economically developed urban centers, this nascent dichotomy between rural
versus urban has not emerged in Russia. Lastly, similar to Peru, no subnational political party
ideologies exist that prioritize women’s issues in Russia. Moreover, ideology seems to be
diminishing in significance and instead is being replaced by the internal interests and whims of
the local male establishment. Gendered power structures in subnational politics remain a
challenge to women’s ability to gain a voice within the constantly changing Russian political
landscape. These social conditions in Peru and Russia intertwine with the political conditions
mentioned below to create a complex system of cultural and political norms, attitudes, and
strategies that women must contend with and navigate in their respective cultural contexts.
This research also found that the following political conditions in theory promote
women’s descriptive representation in subnational politics: free and fair elections; proportional
representation systems; high party and district magnitude levels; institutional historical legacy
attentive toward women’s issues; and subnational gender quotas, particularly those with closed
lists and an institutionalized penalty system. In Peru, free and fair elections with closed-list
options and PR systems facilitate women’s subnational presence, but PR systems must be in
tandem with mandated subnational legislative gender quotas to have the most positive effect
toward women’s representation. High party and district magnitude levels are also helpful
components of its electoral system, but disparity in women’s subnational representation still
exists between rural and urban areas. Regarding Peru’s institutional historical legacy,
authoritarian leader Fujimori arguably made some advances in addressing women’s issues during
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his decade-long political regime, and women from all socioeconomic class found greater
representation in the subnational political realm. This familiarity with and deliberate attention
toward women’s rights in the country’s recent past can cautiously be said to serve as another
force that has encouraged women’s subnational political presence. Peru is one of few countries
in the region of Latin America with municipal gender quotas, which has noticeably improved
women’s political visibility since 1998. While the quota system has not been successful in some
regions of the world, they have been found to assist women’s representation broadly across Latin
America.
In comparison, I find that the effects of Russia’s electoral structure differ greatly from
this paper’s theoretical assumptions. While PR systems are implemented in many regions of
Russia, they have actually been found to not promote women’s subnational representation.
Parties still are not incentivized to include women on their candidate lists, which at least partially
stems from deep-rooted stigmas toward women in politics developed during communist times.
Moreover, the PR system has been noted as being especially ineffective within a broader
authoritarian political system. Instead, nascent research shows that female candidates have fared
better in plurality districts as well as single-member districts. Furthermore, Russia’s history of
low party and district magnitude suggests that subnational female candidates would indeed gain
greater representation in regions that offer higher levels of both. The historical institutional
legacy of communism in Russia remains especially salient in modern Russian society and
politics, as the image and narrative built then that society is egalitarian serves today as an often
intangible but forceful barrier to supporting and normalizing women’s subnational
representation. Women’s positionality as merely symbols in the local political positions they
held during communist times provides another layer of understanding to women’s low
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representation in subnational politics today, as these powerless positions erased any agency they
could exert in making important political decisions. Lastly, Russia has not implemented
subnational nor national gender quotas since 1990, and public initiatives to institute them have
since been rare. While women’s subnational representation was indeed greater under the
Communist-instituted gender quota, it appears that the absence of them in contemporary times
remains a barrier to more egalitarian political representation and processes.
Turning now toward decentralization, effects of decentralization may include stronger
subnational governance, citizen participation, less corruption, and an entryway through which
marginalized groups may gain political voice. At the same time, the research literature has shown
that decentralization reforms result in heightened competitiveness among candidates and
subsequently may serve as a vehicle that pushes women out of political office. Furthermore, I
found that the coexistence of decentralization and democracy is multifaceted and will not
inevitably flourish, especially in non-Western countries. Instead, while these dual forces may
promote women’s representation in Western established democracies, the case studies of Peru
and Russia suggest that the implementation of decentralization reforms in vastly different
cultural contexts yield both positive and negative conditions that both promote and exclude
women in subnational office. These conditions are also contingent on the existing gendered
political and power dynamics of the cultural context, as well as broader structural and social
forces at play.
Decentralization in Peru has overall promoted female candidates occupying specifically
more subnational legislative positions (in comparison to mayoral ones), which can be interpreted
as a positive effect, as this insight symbolizes an access point in which women may be better
able to influence policy and community-level decisions. At the same time, many decentralized
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political structures are not given sufficient budgetary resources to allocate toward supporting
women in subnational electoral races; therefore, while there is a national priority given toward
achieving gender equality in the country, decentralized governments do not have adequate
funding available to create projects and communitywide initiatives to advance women’s rights
and opportunities. Furthermore, gubernatorial and mayoral positions specifically have become
noticeably competitive because of the additional resources they alone receive. Consequently,
male elite candidates have pushed out female candidates in subnational electoral races.
Institutional mechanisms are also noticeably absent within decentralized political structures to
leverage female candidacy or assist in their political roles once they gain office.
In comparison, decentralization in Russia is in constant tension with an overarching state
strategy of centralization, which results in some unintended effects for female candidates within
decentralized subnational governments. This ongoing power struggle underscores the constantly
changing political landscape in modern Russia, which in turn challenges researchers to
conceptualize how to interpret the complex patterns and conditions that influence female’s
representation. Interestingly, decentralized government units are often given autonomy in the
responsibilities they decide to take on, which translates into female candidates being faced with
(and perhaps incentivized by) a spectrum of political activities that transcend the realm of formal
power. Their heightened responsibilities ultimately ensure the “survival” of the local
communities, which underscores the breadth of political, social, and economic issues and
initiatives with which subnational politicians engage (Sätre, 2014, p. 28). It has also been shown
that Russian decentralized spaces are similarly given scarce funding, none of which is allocated
toward advancing women’s rights or opportunities. Furthermore, decentralization has actually
not made Russia’s subnational electoral processes more competitive, in contrast to Peru’s
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mayoral and gubernatorial elections, yet are still controlled by the local male political elite. In
this vein, gendered power dynamics are especially salient in subnational political spaces, perhaps
even more so than national spaces. Perhaps most notably, decentralization reforms have created a
new and unfamiliar political landscape in which female candidates are forced to navigate and
negotiate. As a result, they have been given the agency to develop new and often informal
mechanisms of decision-making and influence within their communities. These examples
showcase perhaps a new wave of subnational female leadership, in which their daily work
extends far beyond the traditional work done by subnational political actors. At the same time,
women vying for office are still challenged by local male elite who control the election
processes. Furthermore, once in office, women must negotiate and cooperate with maledominated community actors and businesses in their political responsibilities, which may
perpetuate the gendered power hierarchy within the subnational political realm. Similar to Peru,
institutional mechanisms are not in place in Russia to support women’s subnational candidacy or
time in office. Lastly, some scholars suggest that decentralization will not promote the inclusion
of marginalized groups in Russia largely because of the ruling male political elite, who do not
feel obligated to share the realm of resources and responsibilities that are passed over to them
(Andrews & de Vries, 2007). Few studies have gathered these diverse effects of Russia’s
decentralization process on marginalized social groups’ representation on the subnational level,
which highlights the relevance of this research paper and importance of future studies on this
topic.
It is useful to conclude with how the case studies of Peru and Russia and importance of
women’s descriptive representation compare to a broader universe of cases. A notable study
focused on women across sub-Saharan Africa, for example, found that greater descriptive
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representation of women in national political office translated into greater women’s political
participation on the local level (Barnes & Burchard, 2012). Earlier in this paper, I suggested that
this connection between national and subnational representation of women was nowhere near as
noticeable in Russia as it may be in Peru. Furthermore, research tracing the effects of
decentralization reforms similarly conclude that they have had divergent and unintended
consequences in non-Western or lesser developed countries. For example, while decentralization
in South Korea has granted subnational political units greater agency in decision-making and
influence, their budgets remain dismally low (Chang, 2010) and extensive institutional
mechanisms to support female candidacy or time in office may be absent. Another report on
decentralization’s effects on women in Uganda revealed that while their descriptive
representation in subnational office increased post reforms, female politicians were “ill equipped
to utilize such opportunities [in office] due to cultural and societal impediments,” including
gendered political institutions and local male elite occupying more prestigious positions of power
(International Development, n.d., slide 6). We can see that the broader empirical trends noted in
this paper then may resonate in other diverse cultural contexts. In particular, conclusions drawn
by several agencies within the United Nations directly align with this paper’s findings:
“Decentralization can reinforce elite power, including discrimination against women” and “fails
to address . . . other structural divisions and inequalities” (International Knowledge, 2008, p. 2).
This paper did not present the international context as a central role, as international-level
discourses and initiatives toward garnering women’s representation may not strongly translate to
or affect the subnational level. One factor to help explain this phenomenon may be that
international policymaking and guidelines could reflect bias or attention on promoting gender
equality at the national-level and thus focus and invest less attention on the subnational social
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and political realms. Another factor often cited is that the presence of decentralization processes
in fact end up “negating governments’ global commitments and obligations,” such as CEDAW
and the Beijing Platform for Action (International Knowledge, 2008, p. 1). At the same time,
studies find that “the support of international agencies and donors is a key contribution to . . .
subnational governments . . . in implementing these actions [toward gender equality] in many
countries” (International Knowledge, 2008, p. 3). This latter observation could be especially
important in regards to promoting women’s political representation within Peru and Russia, and
future research could shed light on the strength of the international community’s presence and its
efforts toward furthering gender equality within these two cultural contexts. This research paper
only briefly mentioned the international dimension to maintain focus on the gendered dynamics
and structures of subnational actors; this focus yields an integrated analysis and helped to refine
an applicable framework for comparative analysis. However, the role of international actors and
organizations does warrant future reference as it may provide an even more holistic lens in
discussing women’s subnational representation.
This research overall presents a comparative case analysis on a topic that is relevant in
contemporary gender studies and comparative politics, revealing helpful insights through
building a theoretical framework and then applying it to examine the political and social
landscapes of Peru and Russia. While a considerable amount of research has been done on
subnational governance and decentralization in these two countries separately, less attention has
been placed on identifying the multifaceted effects of these political reforms and interactions
with existing sociopolitical forces on marginalized groups such as women. These findings
contribute to ongoing discussions about methods for improved subnational governance and the
civic engagement of women. This research also highlights the uneven and fluid effects produced
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by the intersection of political and social forces with a country’s political reforms and processes.
The ways in which these elements interconnect greatly differ in and are highly contingent on
each cultural context. Decentralization reforms are particularly variable, as they can serve as an
outright obstacle to women’s subnational representation amidst existing male political elite
circles and broader structural gendered power structures. The unanticipated consequences of
decentralization reforms provide a cautionary tale for advocates and government leaders. Deeper
understanding of the intersecting dynamics of political, social, and cultural conditions clearly are
important to advancing effective strategies to increase women’s political representation in the
subnational realm.
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